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INTRODUCTION
The smoke from the crops and the burned village wafted by his nose as he gazed at the walls of Athens beyond. The smoke gave him pleasure. It was oddly fresh and he hoped that it signaled the coming of a great victory and the end of this war he did not want. He spied his emissary coming out of the walls sprinting towards him. The Athenian army would follow shortly and then he and the rest of the Spartans would win the battle, subdue the city and go home. Ordering his phalanx to form for battle, he wanted only the confirmation of an Athenian sally.
His emissary arrived and choked out, "My King, the Athenians say they will not come out."
Upset that his plan had failed, the King asked "Why not?" "Pericles said that we were not threatening his center of gravity."
The King thought about this and then said, "What the hell is gravity?" 1 Almost 2,500 years later, a similar scene played out over NATO's air operation against Serbia in 1999. While the concept of center of gravity was known by this time, confusion reigned on what it was exactly and how to apply it. For the overall commander, it was the Serbian ground forces in Kosovo; 2 his senior air commander thought otherwise and pushed for direct attacks on infrastructure and other 'high value' targets in Serbia proper. 3 The final report on American operations during this conflict alludes to the difficulty in applying the concept. In summary, the report states that it may have been the combination of all these factors that led Serbia to accept NATO's conditions for ending the conflict. 4 While this is a most reasonable conclusion, it points to at least some difficulty in applying the concept of center of gravity in the real world.
The thesis of this essay is that the US military is trying to use the concept of center of gravity for purposes it was not intended and, in the process, may be severely limiting the concept's practical usefulness. It must be noted in this introduction that the criticism in this essay is directed at some of the ways we are using the concept and not at the concept of center of gravity itself nor its value to the US military. There is no intent to throw the baby out with the bathwater.
The basic questions to be asked are what does the concept mean and, how was it intended to be used. The answers will be contrasted with how the US military is currently using center of gravity and point out some potential pitfalls in our approach. This paper will also cover alternative views on problems with our use of the concept and different solutions that have been proposed. The end product is a set of recommendations on how we can use the concept of center of gravity to our best advantage in the future.
WHAT DID CLAUSEWITZ MEAN?
Since Clausewitz was the first to use the term center of gravity in a military sense 5 and is the source of this concept in our doctrine, it is appropriate to start at the source in answering the questions posed above.
Clausewitz's description of how he thought of center of gravity is worth quoting in full.
"What the theorist has to say is this: one must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends." 6 This definition is quoted in full as one notices is that it is not quite as precise or definitive as is sometimes presented.
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The first thing to note is that center of gravity is a metaphor, not a precise definition or description of an idea. In an age where Newtonian principles were widely known and used, it made sense to use this metaphor to attempt to describe a 'something' that needed to be impacted on in one way or another to achieve victory. This lack of development of his concept must be considered atypical. Clausewitz normally went to extraordinary lengths to let the reader know exactly what his thought process was in coming up with his theories on war and tried to make what he was talking about as clear as possible. That he did not when writing about center of gravity and his abrupt ending of the discussion leads to the conclusion that his thought on this subject was incomplete. We are left with an idea or concept and not a well thought out set of prescriptions.
What one can take from Clausewitz on centers of gravity is the need to recognize that there are some sources of power (and these could be physical, geographical or moral)
11 that enable the enemy and yourself to accomplish the mission or prevent the other side from doing so.
When this can be identified, the center of gravity should enable a commander to focus on the essential things he must do or prevent and not waste time and resources on subsidiary tasks in relation to the objective that have no relationship to victory. As such, center of gravity is an extremely valuable concept in gaining victory. Clausewitz would have opposed using center of gravity, or any other of his concepts for that matter, as things to be used as elements of process. "But any method by which strategic plans are turned out ready-made, as if from some machine, must be totally rejected."
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WHERE WE ARE AND HOW WE GOT HERE
Recent articles and analytical books written on center of gravity make clear the doctrinal confusion within the American military today on this topic. As Dr. Joe Strange of the Marine Corps University points out, each one of the services has (or had) different definitions. 13 In addition to the service and joint definitions is Colonel John Warden's 'Five Rings' approach to center of gravity which arrays them in conceptual rings with the center being the most important.
14 While there is undoubtedly some difference of opinion among the services, and within them as far as that goes, the only reason that this should concern military planners is that center of gravity has also been enshrined in joint and service doctrine as a critical element in the operational planning process. Unlike the 'Principles of War', which, while important, are not part of the planning process per se, center of gravity has been introduced in to the planning process as a specific step. 15 And this is the rub. Having, principles or concepts that help a planner or commander in thinking through a military problem is one thing. Having the same thing as a doctrinal requirement in a process is another. With the former, differences of opinion on what a principle or concept means are not terribly important -the importance is in the quality of decision making that results. As part of a process, and one where it is one of the major 'drivers' of the final plan, 16 these differences have the potential for causing serious mistakes in the plan. It is worth noting in this context that there is no place in the process that evaluates 11 Clausewitz mentions only physical and geographical ones. It is reasonable to assume that he would have included moral centers as well given his emphasis on the moral aspect of war -On War, p. 77 discussing 'will' for example. He does not really discuss economic sources of power. courses of action in relation to the Principles of War which begs the question of why this is necessary for center of gravity.
To understand why our current use of the concept is dangerous, some background is helpful.
First of all, the rationale behind the concept is not new. As Professor Michael Handel, one the foremost experts on Clausewitz, notes, the basic idea is present in the writings of Sun Tzu who wrote over 2,000 years before Clausewitz came up with the term. 17 The idea has been around a long time.
A famous example of using the concept of center of gravity was Lincoln's judgment during 
PROBLEMS WITH CENTER OF GRAVITY
A basic difficulty is that a center of gravity can be extremely hard to identify in all but the most simple of military operations. Intelligence will be imperfect, a situation may not have developed to the point where a center of gravity has formed, we may mirror image our opponent and so on. If we get the center of gravity wrong and this determines the outline of the rest of the plan, the operation starts out fatally flawed. Going back to the Kosovo example, if all efforts had been focused on the Serbian forces in Kosovo who were seen by the CINC as the center of gravity, 28 NATO might have failed in the operation. Without the unremitting pressure on other 'fronts'; diplomatic, economic and militarily in Serbia proper, Milosovic might still occupy Kosovo. With the ineffectiveness of air power against Serbian forces in Kosovo, the only way to get at this center of gravity may have been an expensive ground campaign.
NATO was heading in this direction when the Serbians gave up. Whether American will to persevere or NATO solidarity would have stood up to the pressures of a ground campaign is problematic at best. We were actually fortunate in this case that there was disagreement on what the center of gravity was and that a single one was not allowed to drive the entire operation.
Related to the difficulty in identifying the center of gravity is the fact that it can change rapidly either through the press of events or by deliberate decision on the part of one of the belligerents. As an example of both, in the early stages of World War II in the Pacific, a good argument could be made that the Japanese aircraft carrier force was the theater-strategic (and when encountered, operational) center of gravity. Japan's ability to wage war effectively against the United States rested on its ability to use the resources of South East Asia and to keep the United States away from both Japan's sea lines of communication and strategic targets in Japan. Once the carrier force was destroyed, Japan replaced a material center of gravity with a moral one -the supposed willingness of its population to mount a suicidal resistance. To its credit, the United States recognized this shift and accommodated it. The decision to use the atomic bomb coupled with that to allow the Emperor to retain the throne were a result of this recognition.
American doctrine is unclear on how many centers of gravity there are at each level of war during any particular operation, campaign or war. 29 The clear preference is for having only one at any particular level 30 -a literal interpretation of Clausewitz. Again, we will use an example from World War II at the strategic level to demonstrate that this, while perhaps an ideal situation, is not necessarily the case. Using some definitions of center of gravity, they are probably right. Each one of these strengths however fits the criteria as a "source of massed strength. . . that would have the most decisive impact on the . . . defeat any of the Allied centers of gravity but their failure to focus on any made defeat close to inevitable.
In summary, the potential problems with applying the concept of center of gravity as we are trained to in the US Military are that there may be more than one at any given time and level of war, we may have great difficulty in identifying them and they may change rapidly and without our knowledge. The conclusion from these examples is that the use of the concept of center of gravity is entirely dependent on the situation in the most general sense. Where a center of gravity is clear (or your opponent has more resources) it may make sense to use a single center of gravity as the unifying theme for an operation, campaign or war. Where it is unclear (or you have lots of resources) it may make more sense to pursue multiple potential centers of gravity or conduct operations simply to develop the situation. A commander may also have the ability to shape what the enemy center of gravity will be. Say, for example, the operational objective is to prevent an enemy from transporting raw materials to his home industries (which is a center of gravity for a theater-strategic objective) and the commander has been given the option of either being given submarines or aircraft to accomplish this. Depending on which option he picks, the operational center of gravity could be either the enemy anti-submarine force or his air defense capability. It is worth noting that perhaps the single thread that runs through On War is that the practical demands of the situation should drive decision making.
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Theory is useful in recognizing the situation and giving one tools to take the best advantage of it but not a formula for success.
ability to accomplish a given military objective." Operational Warfare, p. 309. All were a source of 'massed strength' and all were decisive in accomplishing the objective.
OTHER VIEWS
Other writers who think we are on the wrong track with center of gravity point to our confusion over definitions or improper application as the major problems that need to be fixed.
Their prescriptions generally focus on improving our doctrine.
One proposed solution is to come up with truly joint doctrine with a single theory of war that defines and uses center of gravity in a consistent manner. 34 In other words, center of gravity means the same thing and is applied in the same way in all situations. Everyone agrees on what it is and once identified, all go along their merry way destroying or protecting it and wars are won as quickly and efficiently as possible.
There are some real problems with this approach. First, it is safe to say that coming up with a unified theory of war (of which center of gravity would be just one of the components) is going to be exceedingly difficult. Aside from normal bureaucratic and institutional opposition, there is no real agreement among the services about what is the correct theory of war. Some also argue that going to a single theory of war would limit our flexibility. 35 One could go further and say that, given that war involves imperfect and inconsistent human behavior, the task is The basic argument is that doctrinal differences on the concept are only symptoms of a larger failing -no universally accepted theory of war. That aside, the article does a great job of laying out some of the questions to be answered.
impossible and that there is no single theory of war that will work in all situations. A glaring example of over-reliance on a particular 'theory of war' in our history was the ascendancy of strategic nuclear war in the mid to late 1950s. This turned out to be a theory of war that was not applicable in any real world situation. The cure might be worse than the disease.
Another approach, put forth by Dr Strange, is to further break down the use of center of gravity by introducing 'Critical Requirements' (CRs) and 'Critical Capabilities' (CC's) to the doctrinal mix. 36 It is unclear how adding two new concepts (which have no interservice recognition) to one we already don't have a common understanding of improves the situation.
This does not mean that Dr Strange's logic should be rejected. His book provides a good guide to an understanding of center of gravity. His approach also uses a step by step approach to determining centers of gravity which may work in many situations but certainly not all. Again, taking a mechanical, very specific approach could exacerbate the drawbacks to this approach mentioned above.
Even a minimalist approach that aims only at coming to a fully agreed upon definition or understanding of center of gravity should be eschewed. Understanding that doctrine is supposed to provide practical assistance to commanders and planners for them to use according to the situation, coming up with a single understanding is counterproductive. It is also unnecessary. The current joint definition is a good one and the discussion in our Doctrine for Joint Operations provides excellent guidance for how the concept should be used. It is specific 35 Mackubin T. Owens, "The Use and Abuse of 'Jointness'", Marine Corps Gazette, (November, 1997), p. 57. 36 Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities, enough to get the idea across and vague enough to allow for varying understandings of that idea.
RECOMMENDATIONS
There are two types of recommendations that follow from the argument presented in this paper. The first deals with doctrine; the second with how a commander might apply the concept in coming up with his plan. As long as these discrete ideas are within the ballpark, they allow the different services to bring different perspectives and solutions to joint efforts. This diversity makes it far more likely that the right center or centers of gravity will be chosen based on the situation. One size does not fit all.
The second, thing to do is disassociate center of gravity from the planning process as a formal step in that process. It, like the principles of war, is an exceptionally useful concept in understanding a situation and determining what one is going to do to accomplish the mission.
Considering the situational dynamics discussed above, where it fits into the development and execution of plans should be left up to the commander.
The concept of center of gravity provides the commander with an intellectual tool to concentrate on essentials in accomplishing his mission. He should demand different definitions from different sources to determine which ideas of center of gravity fit the situation he is faced with. He needs to be aware that they can change rapidly and that there may be several operative at any one time.
The great British military theoretician J. 
CONCLUSION
Center of gravity is one of the most valuable concepts to be introduced into the post Vietnam military. One can not read Colonel Summers book without shuddering at the fundamental mistakes the United States made in Vietnam. We have made great strides in our operational and strategic conduct of war as demonstrated by the Gulf War. In the process however, we seem to be taking a useful concept or analytical tool and trying to turn it into something it was never intended to be. Fortunately, the solution to this problem is fairly simple.
All it requires is to accept the progress we, collectively, have made in understanding the concept, tolerating the differences that exist and actually making our planning process less complicated. In an age of increasing complexity, this should be welcome news.
